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The Frente Popular and the god Augustus
There is one supremely common and paradoxical 
experience in scientific research: the difficulty scien-
tists themselves encounter in accepting new discover-
ies that force them to change their own ideas. This is a 
universal fact; it occurs in all fields of knowledge, and 
it is not difficult to explain. It is based on human be-
ings’ way of reasoning. We should recall that this was 
precisely the subject of Thomas Kuhn’s famous the-
sis of scientific revolutions. He realised that scientists 
form communities whose common feature is that all 
their members share a “paradigm”, which he under-
stood to be a constellation of convictions that, wheth-
er true or not, have become “pre-scientific”; they no 
longer require empirical justification, and are merely 
believed without further enquiry. And their influence 
over scientists is such that they condition the whole 
process of their research: from the choice of the sub-
ject to be investigated, to the angle from which this 
subject is studied, the questions that are asked about 
it, the method used, the techniques applied and even 
the selection of the results that stand out as relevant 
(and the exclusion of the ones considered irrelevant). 
The best example given and described by Kuhn was 
heliocentrism: he observed how it had been proposed 
by Copernicus in the 1540s, when it was accepted by 
some and rejected by others. Half a century later, 
when Galileo made it his own, the tables had turned; 
the so-called “scientific revolution” was a thing of the 
17th and not the 16th century. 
If Kuhn had lived a few years longer, he would have 
seen even more paradoxes: according to the experts, 
there was no scientific revolution in the 17th century, 
and regardless of whether there was or wasn’t, the 
“revolutionary” scientists were not aware they were 
part of a revolution. 
If, in addition to that, Kuhn had lived even longer 
and seen what remained of his thesis in scientists’ 
minds of, he would have been even more amazed. 
In the new millennium, a multitude of scholars were 
using the word “paradigm”, but giving it the opposite 
meaning to Kuhn’s: a paradigm was no longer the con-
stellation of convictions shared by scientists, but the 
revolutionary scientific proposal with which a person 
aims to this constellation. That is, these scholars see a 
paradigm as a proposal to break the paradigm in the 
meaning intended by Kuhn. 
Over time, Kuhn came to realise that this occurred 
not only in scientific communities but in all human 
gatherings, including in illiterate societies. The expla-
nation lies in the fact that the “paradigm”, as under-
stood by Thomas Kuhn, is not the fruit of the commu-
nity (scientific or not), but the indispensable condition 
that makes it possible for that community to exist. We 
form communities precisely because we share suffi-
cient convictions to ensure we can understand each 
other and coexist harmoniously. This is the pre-con-
dition for coexistence. The paradox is that progress 
implies precisely breaking convictions. Without this, 
no advance is possible. 




This complicates things: the compatibility between 
coexistence and progress requires an equilibrium that 
is not always easy to achieve; progress is frequently 
reduced to the wishes of those whose voice is heard 
loudest, a path that weakens rather than reinforces 
coexistence. This, for example, is what today is consid-
ered “political correctness”.
There are multiple examples of this –repeating what 
has been established as being politically correct– 
throughout history. This year sees the commemora-
tion of one such occasion, the second Russian Revolu-
tion in 2017, the Bolshevik Revolution. Until 1989, it 
was politically correct to consider communism merely 
as a form of progress, and it was incorrect to recall 
the millions of Russians –genuinely millions– who per-
ished in the first five years of the Bolshevik regime, 
first in the 2017 revolution, and then in the civil war 
that followed. And the matter of Stalin and Stalinism 
was barely even mentioned.
This is exactly the case in Spain today with every-
thing that has occurred since 1931. It is politically 
correct to assert that a democratic republic was pro-
claimed that year and that in 1936 it was crushed by a 
handful of fascists in the armed forces. Manuel Álva-
rez Tardío and Roberto Villa have demonstrated that 
this did not happen quite so maladroitly in their book 
1936: Fraude y violencia en las elecciones del Frente 
Popular, a work whose success has been as wide-
spread as it has been silent. It has only been men-
tioned in the press in contemptuous terms and amid 
denials of its scientific worth. I am therefore going to 
voice my opinion, however much it may fly in the face 
of political correctness. I have already explained why 
progress (in this case, in knowledge) can weaken co-
existence, but also strengthen it, albeit in the medium 
term. My long experience as a historian has shown me 
that the truth always leads to freedom, however un-
palatable it may be.
I should note in advance that the authors of the 
book I mention do not discuss the events occurring 
since the coup d’état of July 1936, and much less the 
ensuing civil war. Nor do they touch on the 40 years 
of dictatorship that followed. They may believe that 
these whirlwinds were the product of those winds; 
but I am absolutely certain they do not consider it to 
have been unavoidable. As I see it, the Franco dicta-
torship did not last for forty years because the he won 
the war, but because he won the war and took ad-
vantage of his victory to remain in power. The actual 
war of 1936-1939 did not last three years because a 
handful of generals staged a coup d’état that July, but 
because many Spaniards –and many non-Spaniards– 
reacted to this event by engaging in a conflict in which 
one side took three years to defeat the other. In fact, 
this is the reason the generals prevailed, even despite 
the fact that their coup d’état was basically a failure (I 
refer to the events of 18 July, 1936).
It would require at least a book to explain all this, 
and to point out that winds produce whirlwinds only 
if the circumstances are right or if they give rise to 
a wind that then turns into a whirlwind. And these 
circumstances include decisions taken freely for or 
against the wind; decisions that can only be taken 
when the wind has already begun to blow, when it 
may still be little more than a breeze.
By saying this I seek to emphasise that in my un-
derstanding of the work of Manuel Álvarez Tardío and 
Roberto Villa on the elections of February 1936, they 
do not even remotely imply that the falsification of 
these elections legitimised the coup d’état that took 
place five months later. The coup was the result of a 
decision that concerned what occurred after those 
elections and which never should have occurred. It 
was not an unavoidable result of the falsification of 
the electoral results.
In fact, the book I refer to was part of a line of research 
that has taken a completely different tack. The first book 
I read by these authors was the work of Álvarez Tardío 
(Anticlericalismo y libertad de conciencia: Política y re-
ligión en la segunda república española, 1931-1936, 
Centro de Estudios Constitucionales, 2002), which ex-
plained the process of constituting the second Spanish 
Republic in 1931. It shows how some of the winners of 
the June elections that year imposed on the others –also 
winners– a maximalist constitution that excluded the 
losers, when it could have created a legal sphere of coex-
istence between winners, losers and those who did not 
consider themselves to be either winners or losers (who 
may well have been the majority).
The second work I read was another book in which 
both authors studied the constituent process and the 
development of electoral legislation in the Cortes of 
1931-1933 (El precio de la exclusión: La política du-
rante la Segunda República, Ediciones Encuentro, 
2010), which clearly supported what I said above, but 
applied to the future: the winners sought to ensure 
that in future elections the victory of their opponents 
would be prevented by the laws themselves. They 
could have refrained from proposing and approving 
an exclusive legislation of this kind, but they went 
ahead (although in spite of everything, they lost and 




had to relinquish power); not only that, but some sup-
ported the so-called October Revolution of 1934.
As far as I know, Álvarez Tardío and Roberto Villa do 
not discuss this October Revolution any further than is 
necessary for an understanding of what subsequently 
occurred. The third work I read by these authors was 
the book on the elections of the Frente Popular in 
February 1936, in the aforementioned Fraude y vio-
lencia en las elecciones del Frente Popular. What they 
conclude in this work –because it is proved by events– 
is that these elections were held in an atmosphere 
of coercion that, among many other things, caused 
several civil governors to flee or to be immobilised on 
election day. Due to this, and to other similar forms 
of coercion, it was very easy to falsify the election re-
turns in several Spanish districts. And they were falsi-
fied. Simply that.
In this note I really wanted to say nothing more. 
Of course, much more occurred in the following five 
months up until the military coup d’état of July 1936. 
But this is not what Álvarez Tardío and Roberto Villa 
examine in this outstanding work, but what was men-
tioned earlier.
Does that mean an end to the notion that this was 
a peaceful and model democratic republic? I am in 
no doubt that it does. A republic whose constitution 
(1931) contains articles that make peaceful existence 
–let alone coexistence– impossible for one part of 
the country’s inhabitants cannot be considered ei-
ther peaceful, model, or democratic; it reinforces ex-
clusion through electoral legislation, not to mention 
the falsification of the election returns in 1936. This 
is not to investigate history pro domo sua; it is sim-
ply to study, to reach certain conclusions, and then 
to publish them.
Álvarez Tardío and Roberto Villa have not wished to 
respond to those who have accused them of every-
thing under the sun, with one exception, –as far as 
I am aware–, that of Santos Juliá. The explanation of 
everything that happened –but not the response– can 
be found in a book published months later under the 
direction of Guillermo Cortázar, Bajo el dios Augusto, 
which does not mention the work by Álvarez Tardío 
and Roberto Villa, but rather its subtitle: El oficio de 
historiador ante los guardianes parciales de la historia. 
History, it is true, has “custodians”. It almost always 
does. It is a rare authority that does not use history 
to dispel any doubts as to its own legitimacy, whether 
on the right, on the left, in the centre, or mixed. It is 
more common however to see emergence of histo-
rians who assign themselves the role of “guardians 
of history” without being invited to do so. Cortázar 
explains this point very concisely in the introductory 
chapter. His four co-authors illustrate it with specific 
aspects and facts that speak for themselves. They 
mention Augustus because these are the same kind 
of guardians Augustus had when Seneca marked that 
under his mandate: “What was allowed to be written 
was not yet a danger but it was a source of problems”.
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